Vulnerabilities in several Apache authentication modules

   RUS-CERT has discovered that several Apache authentication modules
   which use SQL databases to store authentication information are
   vulnerable to a remote SQL code injection attack.

  Systems Affected

   Any Apache server using database-based authentication with the
   following modules:

     * AuthPG 1.2b2 by Min S. Kim (also known as mod_auth_pg)
     * mod_auth_mysql 1.9 by Vivek Khera
     * mod_auth_oracle 0.5.1 by Serg Oskin
     * mod_auth_pgsql 0.9.5 by Guiseppe Tanzilli and Matthias Eckermann
     * mod_auth_pgsql_sys 0.9.4 (by the same authors, modifications by
       Victor Glushchenko)

   It is possible that other authentication modules not listed above are
   affected.

  Systems Not Affected

   RUS-CERT has examined the following authentication modules and
   verified that an Apache server using these modules is not vulnerable
   to the problem described in this document:

     * mod_auth_mysql 2.20 by Zeev Suraski
     * mod_auth_ora7 1.0 by Ben Reser
     * mod_auth_ora8 1.0 by Ben Reser

  Attack vector

   HTTP requests sent to the Apache server using the vulnerable
   authentication modules.

  Impact

   In the case of the PostgreSQL modules, an attack can execute arbitrary
   SQL statements or cause the database query for the password to return
   arbitrary data. As a result, unauthorized access to the web server is
   possible.

   With the Oracle module, the attacker can call stored procedures and
   cause the database query for the password to return arbitrary data.
   The impact with MySQL is currently unclear, but with the advent of
   stored procedures, harmful side effects might become possible as well.

  Vulnerability Type

   SQL code insertion attack

  Description

   During the authentication process, the password hash has to be looked
   up in the database, so a SQL SELECT statement has to be built. In the
   vulnerable modules, this is done using code equivalent to the
   following pseudocode:

Query := Sprintf ("SELECT %s FROM %s WHERE %s = '%s'",
                  Password_Column, User_Table, User_Column,
                  User);

   Later on, the retrieved password hash is compared with the one
   supplied by the user trying to authenticate.

   However, the value of User has been received over the network. Suppose
   an attacker choses the string (note the single quotation mark at the
   beginning):

'; SELECT 'wA8aGH92dPQnIDD

   Now the resulting string contains two SQL statements:

     SELECT password_column FROM user_table WHERE user_column = '';
     SELECT 'wA8aGH92dPQnIDD'

   PostgreSQL's libpq client library will transmit both statements to the
   PostgreSQL server. The server will execute both statements and return
   the result of the second to the client. This way, an attacker can make
   it appear to the authentication code that the database contains the
   proper hash for the password it just has provided. Other forms of
   attacks are possible by issuing INSERT or DELETE statements in
   essentially the same manner, of course.

   In the MySQL and Oracle cases, the impact of the vulnerability is
   different. Oracle does not seem to allow multiple SQL statements per
   query, but using a UNION clause to add additional data seems to be
   possible, so the attack given above can be duplicated. In addition,
   stored procedures can be called, with a potential for harmful side
   effects. We were unable to obtain a definite answer if the
   vulnerability is exploitable if a MySQL database is used, since MySQL
   neither supports UNION clauses nor stored procedures.

  Proposed Solution

    PostgreSQL

   We believe that the fact that the essentially the same vulnerability
   is present in many PostgreSQL applications is related to the lack of a
   suitable string quoting function in the PostgreSQL client library (and
   not just to code reuse and overlap among the authors).

   Therefore, we propose that a function which escapes characters treated
   specially by the PostgreSQL by replacing them with safe character
   sequences is included in the PostgreSQL client library. We provide a
   mostly untested sample implementation:

     * Escaping Strings in PostgreSQL Queries
       (http://cert.uni-stuttgart.de/doc/postgresql/escape/)

   Some of the fixed versions below already implement this suggestion.

    MySQL and Oracle

   Both the MySQL and Oracle client libraries provide a suitable function
   for quoting strings in SQL queries. The authentication modules which
   are not vulnerable (see above) use them, so we propose to use these
   modules, or the fixed versions below.

  Patched Versions

   Several authors have already reacted and released new versions:

     * AuthPG 1.3 by Min S. Kim (http://authpg.sourceforge.net/)
     * mod_auth_mysql 1.10 by Vivek Khera (ftp://ftp.kcilink.com/pub/)
     * mod_auth_pgsql 0.9.6 by Guiseppe Tanzilli
       (http://www.giuseppetanzilli.it/mod_auth_pgsql/dist/)

   Serg Oskin has announced a fixed version as well.

  Contact Status

   RUS-CERT contacted the authors of the vulnerable authentication
   modules on 2001-08-23.

  About RUS-CERT

   RUS-CERT (http://cert.uni-stuttgart.de/) is the Computer Emergency
   Response Team located at the Computing Center (RUS) of the
   University of Stuttgart, Germany.

  URI For This Advisory

   http://cert.uni-stuttgart.de/advisories/apache_auth.php

-- 
Florian Weimer 	                  Florian.Weimer@RUS.Uni-Stuttgart.DE
University of Stuttgart           http://cert.uni-stuttgart.de/
RUS-CERT                          +49-711-685-5973/fax +49-711-685-5898